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ABSTRACT
In my study I focus on important topics of the new 
banking regulation Basel III: leverage and liquidity. 
Using linear regression I analysed banks’ long term 
liquidity and leverage ratios and profitability in 12 
emerging market, new member, countries and in 15 
developed, old member, countries of the EU betwe-
en 2008 and 2010. I point out that in EU12 there is 
negative relationship between profit and interbank 
market dependence in 2010, while positive corre-
lation between profit and funding base stability ratio. 
In the case of EU15 there is a negative correlation bet-
ween solvency and profitability in 2008, while the re-
lationship is positive between capital quality – more 
Tier 1 capital – and profitability.
Furthermore, I have tested the Myers-Majluf theory 
with monthly aggregated equity issue and the Dow 
Jones financial institutions index changes relating to 
the eurozone between 1990 and 2011. According to 
this theory, equity issue leads to lower equity prices. 
I point out that on an aggregated level (eurozone) 
the theory cannot be proved. Myers-Majluf theory 
is particularly important in the process of banking 
recapitalisation, since it is this theory that dictates 
slower banking capitalisation. From the perspective 
of a macroprudential policy capital increase would be 







Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Tamas J,.  2013. Basel III: Rethinking liquidity and 
leverage, Ekonomska istraživanja – Economic Research Special Issue 2013
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I. INTRODUCTION        
In Canadian banks’ financing structure the proportion of deposit is higher than interbank funds. 
This can serve as an explanation to the higher stability of the banking system Ratnovski L., Huang 
R. (2009). The big banks with higher Tier 1 capital and higher deposit proportion among their li-
abilities at the end of 2006 could withstand the crises; moreover, they had higher profitability also 
Beltratti A., Stulz R. (2009).
In the academic debate about regulation - growth trade off, it is important to mention the 
costs of banking failures, which amounted to 1346,2 billion USD between 2007-2010. The figure 
relates to a review on 39 European and American banks, whose loss was caused by toxic securities 
as well as bad credits Reuters (2011).
In addition to the less transparent relationship-lending financing Calomiris C and Kahn 
C. (1991) the wholesale interbank funding can be explained with higher credit opportunities and 
better credit monitoring possibility. Ratnovski L., Huang R (2008) already warned of the negative 
effect of arm’s length financing during the crisis – wholesale interbank refinancing – if it is coupled 
with aggressive credit strategy, because it can cause a sudden drain of capital in case of negative 
information.
Kenneth R. French [et al.]’s (2010) suggestion with regards to the regulation of financial 
system are the following: 
•	 ceteris paribus – since big banks hold also systemic risk, their required capital has to be 
higher than the proportional one. Brunnermeier [et al] (2009) would ask the countries 
to create a list about big banks and using macroprudential regulation, they would 
define their add-in to the systemic risk.
•	 the required capital needs to depend on the assets’ liquidity the bank holds.
•	 the financial institutions’ capital requirements must increase proportionally to their 
short-term liabilities.
Basel III allows a rather long period for banks to raise their capital BCBS (2010c) and MAG 
(2010). Arnold et al (2012) emphasize that capital is cheap and is available in appropriate quanti-
ties in times of upswing. Kashyap, Rajan, Stein (2008), Borio, Zhu (2008) underline that equity 
issue is particularly difficult in times of uncertainty. In times of crisis Stulz’s (1999) thesis – globali-
sation decreases the cost of capital - can be vulnerable. Though Ayadi (2012) acknowledges the 
efforts of Basel Committee at increasing the capital quality, as well as working out liquidity and 
leverage ratios, he thinks that the length of the transition period will dilute these corrections and 
new regulations. Borio (2012) urges the recapitalisation of banks among the banking regulation 
measures - including the possibility of temporary state ownership –; moreover, he also urges the 
investigation and write-down of overall losses, the transparency of banks, the importance of bad 
assets’ management in order to follow the Scandinavian example and not the Japanese one. While 
Scandinavian countries took these measures, Japan did not at the start of the 1990s’ banking crisis.
One possible reason for the transition period’s length is that equity issue is more expensive 
than bond issue and banking credit. Kashyap, Rajan, Stein (2008) As opposed to the traditional 
capital regulation, which takes the formar statement as a given - Admati et al (2010) call the as-
sumption that equity is more expensive than bond a myth – they focus on investigating why 
banks consider capital as a more expensive fund? Knowing the reason “would reduce the drag of 
economic growth associated with capital regulation, as well as lower the incentives for regulatory 
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arbitrage.”
Gale (2010) warns that the raising of capital ratio forces banks to hold riskier assets in order 
to achieve the targeted return.
The high leverage of the financial institutions can have significant negative effects. Equity 
is the “expensive” form of liabilities. Admati and Pleiderer (2009) warn that these two contentions 
lead to trade off. Starting from Modigliani-Miller theorem they underline that equity is neither 
expensive nor cheap. The total cost of equity is influenced by several factors (taxes, cost of failure, 
agents’ cost, information asymmetry) but this does not mean that the expected return is also 
higher. The issue of risk in the Basel Accord appears in inverse form. The riskier an asset or an off-
balance sheet item is, the more capital needs to be ordered to this position.
IMF (2009) in Arnold et al (2012) claim that those markets where banks with leverage 
played a role became vulnerable more easily. The increase of leverage was not discovered by Basel 
II. The crisis starting in 2007 forced banking supervisions to enhance the current banking regula-
tion requirements both on the national and the international level. Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision developed a new banking regulation, Basel III, focusing predominantly on a new capi-
tal regime; in addition, it created new ratios for measuring liquidity and leverage.
The failure of lots of banks warns of the importance of new regulations. Emerging markets 
in the EU in particular need to face greater difficulties in fulfiling stricter requirements as regards 
capital, liquidity and leverage. The micro- and macroprudential views are totally different with 
respect to equity issue and the improvement of the capital adequacy ratio. In the micro view the 
choice between possible solutions (capital increase, asset shrinkage) is indifferent. From the macro 
point of view there is a great difference. “Fire sale” and the dramatic shrinkage of assets lead to 
serious consequences.
The requirements of capital increase will be put in place slowly over several years (2015 and 
2018). The reason is the Myers-Majluf theorem from 1984, which claims that when corporations 
require additional sources, they turn to equity issue as a last resort only (pecking-order theory).
My paper is divided into five parts. The first part discusses leverage regulation in the old 
and the new regime. In the second part I analyse the current liquidity approach. In the third part I 
test the correlation between the available long-term liquidity, leverage ratios and profit in EU (old 
and new members). Since BIS quantitative impact studies provide available data only on bank type 
level, I only refer to their findings. I test moreover the Myers-Majluf theory – pecking order theory 
– claiming that equity issue leads to price fall in the short run. I analyse the aggregated equity is-
sue in the eurozone. In the fourth, discussion, part, I underline my results in comparison to former 
studies. In the conclusion and results sections, I summarise the most important theses of my re-
search and provide further suggestions with respect to improving the current banking regulation.
II. ABOUT LEVERAGE
The first graph presents return on equity data in 10 emerging market coutries in 2008, 2009 and 
2010. Malta and Cyprus joined EU in 2004 but they will be treated as developed countries.
BASEL III: RETHINKING LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE418
Isépy Tamás
 





















































FIGURE 1. RETURN ON EQUITY IN THE EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES OF THE EU 
Source: ECB Dataware
All countries had remarkable positive profit in 2008, but in 2009 the results are more var-
ied. I highlight the fact that the Baltic states’ banking systems had a solid loss since they had a loss 
amounting to 50%-70% of their capital. In 2010 the profit in Estonia is already positive, while in the 
other two Baltic states the loss decreased.
The second graph shows the return on assets in the ten emerging market countries in EU 

























































FIGURE 2. RETURN ON ASSETS IN THE EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES OF THE EU   
Source: ECB Dataware, Author’s calculations
BASEL III: RETHINKING LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE 419
THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
“THE CHANGING ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE: ISSUES, IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY OPTIONS”
Basel III requires better capital; moreover, it creates a new leverage ratio. Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR) is only an implicit measure of leverage. In 1988 8% of CAR meant a 12,5-fold leverage for 
the whole credit portfolio regardless of the creditworthiness of clients. This ratio provides a lot of 
information in one figure on an aggregate level but a number of individual leverage ratios remain 
lacking in transparency, or, more precisly, these CAR figures (those of banks, countries) are not 
comparable from a leverage point of view. Since they contain credit, market, and operational risk 
constituents, they are only comparable with respect to the needed capital. Risk weighted assets in 
the nominator of the capital adequacy ratio are more complex and they contain information of 
both of the above mentioned risks. 
There are no records of the mechanisms used to form CAR in the 1980s. On what funda-
mentum this ratio relies on remains hidden. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision forced 
banks to disclose their leverage information with the application of the former ratio (5%) of eq-
uity/assets – prescribed before the introduction of CAR, newly amended with off-balance sheet 
plus securitisation measure. The minimum level of the new leverage ratio is 3%. In 1988, with CAR, 
BIS emphasized an implicit 12,5-fold leverage (for credit portfolio), while the new leverage ratio is 
33,3 for the total position (on- and off-balance sheet) of the bank.
The capital/assets ratio CAR (capital adequacy ratio) is not eligible for the analysis of risks 
incorporated by banks and banking systems. There is a lack (and need) of a bank (micro) level and 
a bank system (macro) level ratio, which provide information about leverage. CAR contains sever-
al individual positions (for example, market risk positions) with different leverage ratios and with 
capitals ordered to the individual. In order to measure a bank’s (with CAR of 8%) real risk position 
on a bank or bank system level, there is a need to administer a stress test on the bank system level. 
Stress CARs are available on a bank system level, but not on a monthly basis. The former example 
shows that it is possible that a bank would need a CAR of 9% on a micro level, while another bank 
needs one of 8,5%. Two banks, whose CARs are the same (10%), have not the same risk assuming 
that one has an off-balance sheet item needing 4 units of capital, while the other has none.
III. ABOUT LIQUIDITY
In Basel III the liquidity risk issue represents a new approach. The short- and long-term ratio are to 
be calculated, however no capital needs to be ordered to liquidity risk. Basel III has a stricter capital 
regime than before, a number of banks will not be able to raise their capital in the requested man-
ner from 2013 onwards. 
I think that liquidity risk also needs to be examined. There are two possibilities: first, poli-
cymakers may decide that the net stable funding ratio and the liquidity coverage ratio cannot be 
less than a given amount. (This version is planned in Basel III.) The second possible solution is that 
more attention is paid to liquidity draught, which can cause serious losses. Therefore, a minimum 
of capital requirements needs to be calculated not only for the market risk, but for the liquid-
ity risk also. Ex post to the crisis higher spreads are available for these liquidity dry up situations 
and the losses can be calculated. Ex ante liquidity at risk modelling can also be a good proxy for 
amending market risk calculations.
The different types of market participants on derivatives – hedgers, arbitrageurs, specu-
lants – have also some relevance with respect to liquidity. Hedgers can only have partners on the 
market when there is enough speculation. Moreover, arbitrageurs have an add-in for efficient price 
systems Scholes (1969), Gehrig and Zimmermann (1996). This phenomenon is most important 
because without their participation carry trade suffers distortions. Liquidity draught on short-
BASEL III: RETHINKING LIQUIDITY AND LEVERAGE420
Isépy Tamás
term FX swap can be explained by the decreasing number of arbitrageurs and speculation on the 
market. The lengthening of the refinacing position of the bank’s liabilities has an effect on the yield 
curve; moreover, it can encourage these market participants.
It obviously rarely happens that there is a drought on the foreign exchange market (to be 
more precise, only on one part of the FX market – FX swap market) or on the money market, but 
it also needs to be considered. If the banking system refinance their long term assets in Swiss Franc 
with a three-month interest period, in case of a liquidity dry up the liquidity risk will turn into a 
market risk. In this case, the banking system or individual banks run not only interest rate risks but 
foreign exchange risks also. For this reason, I believe, an appropriate level of capital needs to be 
ordered to this position also. Presumably, periods of liquidity draught last only for short periods 
of time, but the needed capital has to be ordered for positions containing liquidity risks using the 
previously mentioned methodology.
Bleackley and Cowan (2010) analysed corporates (non-financial institutions) and found 
that a firm’s investment response does not depend on their liability’s structure. This result con-
tradicts the maturity mismatch hypothesis, which claims that after liquidity shocks firms with 
shorter term liabilities do remarkably less investment than those with longer-term liabilities.
The new banking regulation Basel III does not propose capital for liquidity risk but will 
force banks to take measures if they do not meet their long-term liquidity requirements. They 
have three options:
•	 decreasing their maturity mismatch
•	 increasing the proportion of longer term funds
•	 reducing their financial assets.
The Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem is only applicable in complete markets since on the 
macro level, and on a country basis also, the quality, proportion, and maturity of liabilities can 
influence the profitability of a banking system.
Bleakley H., Cowan, K., (2010) emphasize that “unfortunately, the ‘macro’ observation that 
crises occur with greater frequency in economies that have more short term indebtedness (or 
more short term indebtedness relative to international reserves) does not constitute sufficient 
evidence of this mechanism”.  They investigated corporations in emerging markets.
ECB (2010) emphasize that the reason to allow a longer introduction period for the two 
liquidity measures is “to ensure that the new measures do not represent an excessive burden on 
the financial sector”.
Table 1 shows the time schedule for the introduction of liquidity and leverage ratios. 
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TABLE 1. PHASE-IN ARRANGEMENTS OF LIQUIDITY’- AND LEVERAGE RATIOS’ I 
MPLEMENTATION





























Since ECB dataware is not complete regarding the derivatives of emerging market countries in EU, 
moreover, BIS maintains only aggregate derivative data of the different groups of countries, there 
is no appropriate ratio for leverage available.
According to the comprehensive quantitative impact study published by BIS (2010b), the 
leverage ratio for large banks is 2,8% - so below the 3% limit -, while for smaller banks it is 3,8%. 
Large banks have higher leverage and so a smaller leverage ratio. Thus, on average, large banks cur-
rently do not fulfill the leverage requirements. The 30-day liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) suggested 
by BIS for large banks is 83% on average, while for smaller banks it is 98%. The net stable funding 
ratio, which highlights the liquidity mismatch of large banks, is 93%, while for smaller banks it is 
103%.
Usually, BIS databases contain only aggregate data unsorted by countries. The data ECB 
maintain on a country level, however, are not exactly these liquidity ratios.
Here are the BIS suggested ratios for liquidity and leverage purposes:
Leverage ratio = Tier 1 / (bank’s non-weighted assets + off-balance sheet)
Liquidity coverage ratio = stock of high quality assets / net cash-outflows over 30-day time 
period
Net stable funding ratio = (available amount of stable funding / required amount of stable 
funding) > 100%  BIS (2009)
Currently for the BIS suggested Net stable funding ratio the data coming from ECB Data-
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ware – Funding Base Stability Ratio and Interbank market dependence can be used. The first ratio 
shows the proportion of longer term refinancing sources of the banking system of an individual 
country. In case of interbank market dependence, I assume that higher ratio means shorter-term 
funds. The interbank market is typically within the time span of one year, and banks prefer to re-
finance their position in the market on shorter- rather than on longer-terms because it is cheaper. 
Maturity mismatch data are not available. These two ratios published by ECB Dataware however 
can be seen as implicit maturity mismatch ratios on a country level. The former BIS ratio will be 
introduced only in 2013, so the one published by ECB is the only one available and appropriate for 
stability calculation purposes.
BIS defines two liquidity ratios. The first is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), which defines 
the liquidity sufficient within a 30-day period, the other is the net stable funding ratio, which un-
derlines the importance of funds providing a long-term stability. 
For the following regression analysis, instead of the BIS suggested Net stable funding ratio, 
I have used two others which are similar and are available in ECB Dataware between 2008 and 
2010 for comparative country analysis. The first is Funding Base stability ratio1 and the other is 
Interbank market dependence2. 
TABLE 2. LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS IN EU12 AND EU 15 COUNTRIES ROA, ROE AND 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
EU 12 2008 2009 2010 VIF (2010)
M U 
(EU15)
2008 VIF(2008) 2009 2010
ROE ROE
FBSR 0,247 0,128 0,82** 4,826 FBSR -0,333 1,13 0,318 0,296
OS 0,196 -2,601 2,748 923,672 OS -1,669** 6,967 1,019 0,493
LD 0,207 0,144 -0,697*** 1,151 LD -0,038 1,374 0,574 0,187
TETA 0,288 -0,012 -0,606* 8,206 TETA 0,438 2,232 0,196 0,157
Tier 1 0,137 2,862 -1,831 829,319 Tier 1 1,169* 8,374 -0,831 -0,32
R2 0,405 0,483 0,965 R2 0,872 0,492 0,175
Sig 0,005 Sig. 0,028
ROA 2008 2009 2010 ROA 2008 2009 2010
IMD -0,25 -0,314 -0,835* 7,217 IMD 0,442 2,586 -0,335 0,124
OS 0,149 -1,512 3,173 1254,626 OS -1,613** 7,261 1,325 0,18
LD -0,259 -0,273 -0,446** 1,585 LD -0,264 1,822 0,823 0,236
TETA 0,702 -0,014 -0,238 8,598 TETA 0,476 2,267 0,15 0,146
Tier 1 -0,494 2,038 -2,472 1128,377 Tier 1 0,879 8,912 -1,078 -0,166
R2 0,762 0,678 0,943 R2 0,86 0,473 0,123
Sig 0,013 Sig 0,034
Source: ECB SDW, Author’s calculation 
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I investigated the profitability datas (ROE, ROA) of the banking system in EU12 (new) and EU15 
(old) countries with linear regression analysis – with OLS. The explanatory variables were available 
between 2008 and 2010, therefore I prepared a cross-country analysis for each year.
The explanatory variables in case of ROE are:
FBSR – Funding Base Stability Ratio
OS – Overall Solvency
LD – Loan/Deposit
TETA – Total Equity/Total Assets
Tier1 – The best quality capital in percentage of the total assets
In case of ROA:
IMD – Interbank Market Dependence
OS – Overall Solvency
LD – Loan/Deposit
TETA – Total Equity/Total Assets
Tier1 – Best quality capital in percentage of the total assets
Results can be interpreted as follows. There is significant correlation in old EU member 
states in 2008, while in new member states in 2010 between the individual explanatory variables 
and return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). It is important to mention that the quan-
tity of capital increased in NMS during the examined period, while the asset expansion is due to 
the increase of the Polish banking system’s assets almost exclusively. In the OMS the relationship 
cannot be justified after the beginning of the debt crisis starting in 2009.
For the New Member States (EU12) in 2010 FBSR, LD, and TETA are significant explana-
tory variables in the case of ROE , while in the case of ROA, IMD and LD have explanatory value. 
Between FBRS and ROE there is positive correlation, meaning a growth of 1% in FBRS will increase 
ROE by 0,82%. Between LD ratio3 and ROE, as well as ROA, the relationship is negative, that is, the 
increase of this ratio decreases profitability. This result contradicts the OMS results, because there 
the correlation’s coefficient is positive. The TETA – total equity / total assets – ratio is significant 
only in case of ROE, where the coefficient is negative, which can reflect the riskiness of equity 
capital. In the case of ROA the IMD – interbank market dependence –, not surprisingly, negatively 
affects profitability. Linear regression analysis for both profitability ratios (ROE, ROA) amounted 
higher than 0,9 R2 measures. 
For multicollinearity checks I used VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) and found that the criti-
cal value of 10 (SPSS) is not exceeded in cases of significant correlations.
1 Deposits from customers / (funds from credit institutions + funds from depositors (but not from credit institutions) + 
total bonds)
2 Funds from credit institutions / total liabilities
3 The targeted ratio is between 110% and 150%, higher values mean higher vulnerability of the countries banking system. 
Source:ECB Financial Stability Review June 2012
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In EU15 – OMS in 2008 the Overall Solvency ratio increase by 1% resulted 1,6% down of both prof-
itability measures. Lower leverage was coupled with lower profitability in 2008. This contradicts 
Harris, Raviv’s (1991) and Rajan, Zingales’s (1995) results, who found lower profitability in cases of 
higher leverage. The result may be linked with too high levels of capital buffers. The average mea-
sure of CAR was 12% and it rose to 14% in 2010. 
One needs to pay more attention to ROE, which was negative on average in 2008 (-1,44%). 
This was caused by the data preliminary of the Belgian (-44%), Dutch (-11,7%), German (-9,7%), 
and British (-9,7%) banking systems. In the next two years the average ROE figures are already posi-
tive, but the Irish banking system’s extraordinary loss (2009:-36%, 2010:-65%) modified the average 
banking system data downward.
The increase of Tier1 capital by 1% increased profitability by 1,1%. This result supports the 
goal formed in Basel III, namely, setting higher quality and quantity capital requirements for the 
banks. R2 measures were in both cases near to 0,9 (0,87; 0,86). The fact that there is a lack of signifi-
cant relationship between LMD, FBRS and profitability ratios can mean  the higher quality of the 
EU15 banking systems. In 2010, considering the banking assets, the EU15 banking system was 40 
times bigger than the EU12 one.
MYERS-MAJLUF TEST
Between 1990 and 2011 I investigated the monthly net equity issue in the eurozone as well as the 
ratio with total market capitalisation and the monthly changes of the Dow Jones eurozone finan-
cial institutions data. Since equity prices react on the new information immediately, I analysed the 
same month for both DJ index monthly changes and the ratio of issued capital divided by market 
capitalisation to uncover the relationship. I found that the correlation coefficient for new equity 
issues and the monthly index return on an aggregate level (there were no financial institutions eq-
uity indices for the individual countries available) is negative, but the relationship is not significant.
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FIGURE 3. NEW EQUITY ISSUE / TOTAL MARKET CAPITALISATION AND DOW JONES EURO-
ZONE FINANCIAL INSTITUTION INDEX CHANGES (1990 JANUARY – 2011 DECEMBER)
Source: ECB Dataware , Author’s calculation
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Asquith és Mullins (1986) found 3% equity price fall on average at equity issue in their study. 
Masulis (1980) investigated the two-day equity price responses and pointed out a -5,4% average 
change. In the examined period there were in more than 84% of 57 equities negative returns in the 
period of two days after disclosure.
The time series examined do not contain bank-level data, only aggregated monthly data 
for countries and the Euroregion. Therefore, I modified the data and pointed out the following 
relationship. The index fell by nearly 23% in 2008 October at the issueance of 3,8% of the total 
market capitalisation. This fall cannot be interpreted with the help of Myers-Majluf theory, since 
it is the first month of the crisis. For this reason, I removed it from the time series as extreme data.
It is assumed that the aggregated time series represents an individual equity. In this case 
small equity issuances are disregarded since they could lead to distorted results. I have used only 
those issued capital quantities that influence the equity index. Considering only equity issues 
higher than 0,5% of the total market capitalisation, the following result can be concluded. There is 
no relationship between equity issue and equity return on an aggregated level, since the resulting 
graph is an almost flat line.
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FIGURE 4. EQUITY ISSUE AND EQUITY INDEX RETURN. CORRECTED DATASET  
(28 CONSIDERATIONS)
Source: ECB SDW database , Author’s calculation
Using the aggregated corrected time series and having tested the Myers-Majluf pecking or-
der theory, I was led to the conclusion that in the examined period it cannot be stated that equity 
issues are coupled with equity index fall.
Obviously, ideally, one should compare bank level equity issuance and bank level equity 
price returns. Lacking these data, the given data – namely, monthly country level new issuance 
divided by market capitalisation and the Dow Jones Eurozone financial institution index available 
on a monthly basis – yield the former relationship.
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V. DISCUSSION
In the international literature IMF (2012) investigated 37 big banks’ monthly data in the EU be-
tween 2006-2008 and 2009-2011 and found that there is positive correlation between higher capi-
tal buffers, capital ratios and equity returns in the second period, while in the first period there 
is positive significant correlation only between capital buffers and equity price development. In 
the second period for example Tier1/RWA ratio up by 1 % resulted 0,5% in 1 month equity price 
returns. These results can encourage economic policy makers to move towards the further recapi-
talisation of banks.
FIGURE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DELEVERAGING AND LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RATIOS 
Source: ECB (2012)
The ECB (2012) study shows the possibilities for increasing CAR. Evidently, Basel III primar-
ily privileges the raising of good quality capital (Tier1) among other possible solutions. The dele-
veraging process actually relies on two major strategies. The first is the decrease of Risk Weighted 
Assets (both non- and off-balance sheet items) and the second is the increase of capital.
Presumably, the strict prescriptions for Tier1 will accrue concerns for small banks, which 
will not be able to fulfill the requirements in 2015 and 2018, respectively.
The ECB (2012) study emphasizes the positive externalies at the analysis of the deleverag-
ing assessment, while Hanson, Kashyap and Stein (2011) focus directly on the extremely impor-
tant difference between the micro- and macroprudential views. On the micro level it is indifferent 
whether financial institutions lower their financial assets or increase their capital, because both 
measures lead to increased CAR. On the macro level, however, there is a difference. If banks opt for 
decreasing their assets, this can lead to restricted lending and/or liquidity problems. The shrinkage 
of financial assets can cause credit crunch and fire-sale. Particularly in illiquid markets, wholesale 
selling intentions can result in significantly falling prices.
Considering the fact that equity issuance is risky, banks opt for this solution to a lesser 
extent. Myers and Majluf (1984) in their study pointed out that market participants think a new 
equity issuance is a sign that according to the management estimate the equities are overvalued, 
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so the market reacts to the issuance by decreasing the equity price. The pecking order theory My-
ers (2001) states that corporations prefer borrowing money to equity issuance.
First, there is a pressure to push banks towards a higher level- and quality capital position, 
secondly, however, this can mean disadvantages for banks also. Two remarks here follow as to how 
this disadvantage can be lessened:
•	 first, if banks do not hold their own equity, they are not directly affected by the equity 
price fall after issuance; at the most, their later equity issuance can be managed only 
at a lower equity price.
•	 Second, Kashyap, Stein, Hanson (2010) proved that lowering the leverage leads to de-
creasing the volatility of returns; thus, equity as fund becomes less risky and, therefore, 
the cost of equity will be smaller.
The introduction is planned already in 2013, but data disclosure is only obligatory after 
2015. The equity / assets ratio minimum is 3,5% in 2013, 4% in 2014, while 4,5% in 2015. The Tier1 is 
4,5% in 2013 , 5,5% in 2014, 6% in 2015. The liquidity ratios will be implemented in 2015, Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio, and Net Stable Funding Ratio in 2018.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Interbank Market Dependence ratio and the Net Stable Funding ratio are both applicable 
for the preliminary tests of liquidity shocks and for the formation of further requirements. Policy 
makers may set a maximum for IMD on a macro level, which could be a maximum target level in 
the whole banking sector. The Net Funding Base Stability ratio gives information about the banks’ 
own funds and deposits. Here a required minimum level can also be put in place. These two ratios 
are both applicable for measuring the long-term maturity mismatch.
BIS made efforts to ensure a stronger and better capital both on a bank and a bank system 
level, but they did not translate liquidity risk into capital adequacy. Wellink (2010) emphasizes 
that the crisis starting in 2007 is not the crisis of Basel II since most of the banks started to intro-
duce Basel II only in 2008. I agree with him; at the same time, I think that it is a mistake that Basel 
II does not state capital requirements for covering the liquidity risk. No such requirement is part 
of Basel III either; maybe Basel IV will incorporate it.
The Basle Committee developed and proposed two new liquidity risk measures: the first 
for the short term liquidity stress and the second for liquidity mismatches. The Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio will be adopted from 2015 on, the Net Stable Funding Ratio will be put in place as a mini-
mum requirement in 2018.
I suggest that for the transition period until 2015 and 2018 some limit derived from the 
liquidity risk needs to be implemented since in the current crisis the bank system’s withstanding 
ability was affected not only by its capital but also by its liquidity. On the national banking supervi-
sion level these liquidity ratios can be implemented or used as early warning tools.
Goldstein and Turner in BIS (2010) underline that regulators need to monitor the maturity 
mismatch not only on the micro- but also on the macro level since individual financial institutions 
can overestimate their capability to overcome foreign exchange- and interest rate risks during 
short periods of crisis. This is the so-called macroprudential dimension. Liquidity risk “appears” in 
the form of, or is converted into, interest rate- and foreign exchange risks.
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Obviously, the macroprudential policy perspective can be seen as a top-down approach, while the 
microprudential one is a bank level policy. These two approaches need to work side by side each 
other. If the macroprudential policy prescribes high – over the minimum CAR – capital buffer, 
the modelling on the micro level will have less relevance. If the supervisory authority requires a 
macroprudential capital level above the microprudential capital niveau, the question is whether 
it should be done proportionally to the RWA or there is a need for setting leverage ratio for the 
bank system.
Basel II allowed internal models for credit risk in spite of the standard approach at reckon-
ing customer creditworthiness. This could however not hinder the banks’ efforts to decrease their 
capital requirements on the micro-level significantly, using their internal models similar to market 
risk calculations.
On the one hand, it is true that the crisis started not at the implementation of Basel II, but 
Basel III also can only partly meet today’s challenging requirements.
Between 2007 and 2010 the American banks’ ROA was -7% IMF (2010), which means that 
only a CAR higher than 8+7%= 15% (due to the asset weighting in the nominator) could have 
withstood the unestimated losses.
Basel III focused among others on bank capital quality. Swary (1980), Maisel (1981) in Kap-
stein (1991) think that there is no correlation between bank capitalisation and bank failures. Kap-
stein (1991) thinks this hardly imaginable since capitalisation means transparency and confidence 
on the liability side (in case of avoiding eventual deposit drain), secondly, capitalisation plays a 
significant role in the estimation of historical credit default.
I think Basel II was not able to lessen the crisis. Certainly, regulation lags behind market 
developments. Perhaps Basel I simply prescribed uniformly higher capital requirements for credit 
risk than economically needed. In good times regulatory capital requirements were significantly 
above the economic capital. In 2007 banks applied Basel I preparing themselves for the implemen-
tation of Basel II.
Before the introduction of Basel I the capital /assets ratio was 5%, in Basel III the same 
ratio is defined as a minimum of 3%. In this context the -7% ROA is extremely high. Policy makers 
have to take the recapitalisation possibilities of smaller banks into consideration, moreover, the 
disadvantages financial intermediaries in competition when prescribing higher capital require-
ments. At the same time, they cannot delay in setting capital buffers needed for macroprudential 
reasons as well as in introducing the requirements of liquidity risk adjusted CAR, which measures 
will presumably appear in Basel IV. 
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VII. RESULTS
The pressures caused by banking regulation in the coming years can affect several banks seriously. I 
have tested the Myers-Majluf theory and concluded that the pecking-order theory can be proved 
on aggregated level only with corrected data and that on average new equity issuance leads to 
only a slight equity price fall. With sorted data – 28 data between 1990 and 2011 – where equity 
issuance is higher than the 0,5% of the current market capitalisation of the eurozone financial 
institutions, the theory cannot be stated.
I believe that the analysis of this area is particularly important since the reason for delayed 
capital increase lies in this theory, namely, that new equity issuance decreases the price of equity. 
This is why bank managers are reluctant to issue equity in order to raise CAR; they rather prefer 
to shrink their financial assets. This measure, however, includes macroprudential dangers due to 
fire sales and credit crunch. It is important to foreground the arguments of the macroprudential 
policy: equity issuer banks are affected by the falling equity prices directly only in the case when 
they are holders of their own equity, while indirectly only later to the extent of the success of new 
equity issuance. Therefore, the delay in the banks’ capitalisation is emprically not fully justified.
I analysed banks’ profitability ratios (ROE and ROA) between 2008 and 2010 in EU15 and 
EU12 and I sought to to uncover the relationship between liquidity ratios (defined by Basel III) 
– Liquidity Coverage ratio and Net Stable Funding ratio – and capital- and leverage ratio. I was 
led to the conclusion that the correlation was significant in EU12 in 2010, while in EU15 in 2008. 
In EU12 I found correlation preliminary between liquidity ratios – in ECB Dataware net stability 
ratios – Funding Base Stability ratio and Interbank Market Dependence and profitability. That is, 
higher FBSR and lower IMD resulted in significantly higher profitability. In EU15, however, I found 
significant relationship between capital/leverage ratios and profitability. I pointed out negative 
significant correlation between Overall Solvency, and positive significant correlation between 
capital quality (Tier1) and profitability.
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